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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Merrill v. Yeomans1 is widely and 
correctly viewed as a watershed case in which the Court first announced 
that the “distinct and formal claim” has “primary importance” in 
determining “precisely what it is that is patented.”2 But the reasoning 
of the case relied on a pernicious myth that the patent system of the 
era contained such “well-settled rules” as to “leave no excuse for 
ambiguous language or vague descriptions” in textual descriptions of 
inventions.3 Merrill’s myth has had unfortunate consequences, with 
courts occasionally placing unrealistic demands upon inventors—and, 
really, inventors’ attorneys—to write claims with a degree of clarity 
that is often impossible given the technological and legal knowledge at 
the time of patenting. 
Merrill was an early Supreme Court patent decision in which the 
outcome turned on a proper construction of the language in a patent 
claim, which was then a relatively new legal innovation for demarcating 
intellectual property rights that had been required by statute for less 
than a half century.4 The claim asserted by the patentee may have been 
 
†  Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
1. 94 US. 568 (1877).  
2. Id. at 570. 
3. Id. at 573. 
4. Id. at 569; see also Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836). 
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inartfully drafted (though more on that later), and patentee argued 
that the Court should give the claim “a liberal construction” that might 
counterbalance the deficiencies in its drafting.5 The Court refused to do 
so, and as one reason, it expressly relied on the progress achieved in 
patent law in prior years.6 
“The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century 
in this country has reached a stage in its progress where,” the Court 
believed, “[i]t is no longer a scarcely recognized principle, struggling for 
a foothold, but it is an organized system, with well-settled rules, 
supporting itself at once by its utility, and by the wealth which it 
creates and commands.”7 That “developed and improved condition of 
the patent law” left “no excuse for ambiguous language or vague 
descriptions” in patents.8 The Court believed that the “progress” in, 
and “improved condition of,” patent law and its “well-settled rules” 
justified, the limiting construction that it gave to the patentee’s claim.9 
This essay reexamines the claim of “progress” and “well-settled 
rules” in patent law and advances three points. First, at a basic level, 
the Merrill Court was clearly correct that the law in general does 
exhibit progress, and in patent law, that progress has been particularly 
rapid in the last two centuries. Patent claims are but one example. Two 
hundred years ago, patent claims were optional curiosity—a recent 
innovation of patentees’ attorneys who were seeking to define their 
clients’ rights broadly, beyond the particulars of the inventive 
embodiments disclosed in the drawings and descriptions of the rest of 
the patent document. Today, claims are a requirement of patent 
documents worldwide, and they serve an important role in defining the 
scope of the intellectual property rights granted by a patent. The 
practice of claim writing is now sufficiently developed that identical or 
nearly identical claims help demarcate rights across multiple countries.10 
Second, the Merrill Court was clearly wrong to the extent it was 
asserting that the patent system at that time had “well-settled rules” 
about the precise issue before the Court in the case. The Patent Office 
had literally no rules relevant to the claiming issue relevant in Merrill. 
The Patent Office’s “Rules and Regulations” of the era did not even 
bother to list “claims” as a distinct part of the patent application, even 
though the rules did contain distinct rules for the “Drawings,” the 
“Model,” and the “Specification” generally. Moreover, to the extent the 
 
5. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 572–73. 
6. Id. at 573. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 573–74. 
10. Compare U.S. Patent No. 9,474,534 (issued Oct. 25, 2016), with Eur. Patent 
No. 2,964,200 (issued Apr. 19, 2017) (setting forth identically worded claims 
to the U.S. patent). 
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Patent Office’s rules addressed the formatting of claims—which was the 
center of the controversy in Merrill—they did so only in a short 
appendix of exemplary claims, and the example most relevant to the 
issue in Merrill had the same structural issue that the Court faulted the 
patentee in Merrill for having. In sum, while correct in thinking that 
patent law was developing and progressing, the Court badly 
overestimated the degree of progress that the law had made by the time 
that the patent in Merrill had issued. 
A third conclusion is that progress in the law of claiming has 
occurred only slowly and in a highly decentralized manner. Finding 
well-settled rules in the nineteenth-century law on patent claiming is 
difficult because almost every aspect of claiming, or at least every 
substantive aspect of claiming, was still in flux for decades after the 
Court’s decision in Merrill. The development of patent claiming 
practice appears to have been driven in the first instance by 
practitioners themselves experimenting with different stylistic and 
substantive formats. The Patent Office may have had the power to 
enforce uniformity, but it rarely did. And, even where the Patent Office 
did guide the practice, that guidance was not immune from being later 
upset by judicial decisions (quite possibly including the Merrill 
decision). The multiplication of claims—a development frequently, and 
to some extent correctly, decried as undermining the certainty of 
property rights that claims were supposed to provide—is a predictable 
and rational response by attorneys to the uncertainty surrounding 
claiming practice that both preceded and followed Merrill. 
I. Merrill v. Yeomans and the Proper Format for 
Composition of Matter Claims. 
The patent in Merrill v. Yeomans was issued on May 18, 1869.11 
The first sentence in the patent declares that the inventor Joshua 
Merrill has “invented a new and improved Manufacture of Deodorized 
Heavy Hydrocarbon-Oils, suitable for lubricating-oils, or for curriers’ 
use.”12 The key ambiguity in that portion of the sentence lies in the 
word “Manufacture,” which could mean either the product manu–
factured or the process for manufacturing. That ambiguity continues 
throughout the patent into the patent’s first claim, which reads: 
 I claim— 
 [t]he above-described new manufacture of deodorized heavy 
hydrocarbon-oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free 
 
11. U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18, 1869); see also Merrill, 94 U.S. at 
568. 
12. Id. at 1. 
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from the characteristic odors of hydrocarbon-oils, and having a 
slight smell like fatty oil, from heavy hydrocarbon-oils, by 
treating them substantially as hereinbefore described.13 
In the litigation, which commenced on March 25, 1870 (less than a 
year after the patent was issued), the plaintiff asserted that 
“manufacture” referred to a product.14 The defendants claimed it was 
directed only to a process for making the deodorized oil and that they 
could not be held liable for infringement because they were not using 
that process.15 
The Court began its analysis with the correct observation that 
“[t]he word ‘manufacture’ in this sentence is one which is used with 
equal propriety to express the process of making an article, or the article 
so made.”16 The Court also noted that, “if all which is described as new 
in these specifications is really so,” the inventor had made sufficient 
advances to have “a right to a patent for three inventions:— 
1. For a modification or improvement in the distilling apparatus. 
2. For a new process or mode of distilling heavy hydrocarbon oils, 
by which they are deprived of their offensive odors. 
3. For the product of this new process of distillation; namely, the 
deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils fitted for use in the arts.”17 
The first of these three potential inventions (the improved distilling 
aparatus) was covered the patent’s second claim, but that claim was 
not asserted as being infringed. The difficulty in the case was whether 
the patent’s first claim to the “manufacture” covered the second or 
third of the Inventions listed by the Court—i.e., covered the process or 
the product. 
To resolve the ambiguity, the Court relied mainly on three 
arguments, which will be covered here in descending order of 
persuasiveness. The Court’s first and best point concerned the language 
of the claim itself, which concludes with what appears to be a process 
step—“by treating [the hydrocarbon oils] substantially as hereinbefore 
 
13. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The Merrill Court’s quotation of the claim has 
some slight errors, but none that affects the Court’s analysis. See 94 U.S. at 
570 (quoting the patent claim but adding the word “is” before “hereinbefore” 
and omitting two hyphens). 
14. Transcript of Record at 1, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877) (No. 209). 
15. Id. at 3; see also Merrill, 94 U.S. at 568 (explaining that if the patent is for 
the process only, then the defendants will not be found to have infringed). 
16. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570–71. 
17. Id. at 569. 
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described.”18 The Court thought that the inclusion of such a process 
step resolved the ambiguity so that “the most natural meaning” of the 
claim language was “I claim this new mode of manufacturing 
hydrocarbon oils, by treating them as hereinbefore described.”19 That is 
the Court’s best point, although the language could more naturally be 
read to mean that the patentee was trying to claim what modern patent 
practitioners call a “product-by-process” claim, which is a claim 
directed to a product but only if that product is made by a certain 
specified process.20 The trial court in Merrill had adopted that inter–
pretation,21 but because the oils sold by the defendants in the case “were 
produced by a process very different from that described [in the 
patent],”22 Merrill still lost his infringement case at trial. Thus, on 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Merrill’s counsel “disclaim[ed]” the trial 
court’s interpretation that the claim covered only a product produced 
by the process described in the patent.23 That disclaimer forced the 
Court to choose between reading the claim as a pure product claim or 
a pure process claim, and given that choice, the Court was probably 
correct that the latter reading is supported the inclusion of the process 
step in the claim language. 
The Court next advanced contextual arguments based on the 
language in the rest of the specification. One sentence in the 
specification declared that Merrill’s “invention will be used . . . to 
produce the deodorized heavy oils above described.”24 In that sentence, 
the Court noted, “[i]t is very clear that what he here calls his invention 
is a thing which produces the deodorized oils, and not the oil itself.”25 
While that’s true, the Court itself recognized that Merrill had properly 
claimed his improved “distilling apparatus” as one of the two claimed 
inventions in the patent.26 His reference to invention in the sentence 
quoted by the Court could have been properly referring to the claimed 
distilling apparatus and not his claimed new “manufacture.” In another 
 
18. Id. at 571 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18, 1869)).  
19. Id. (emphasis added).  
20. See Patent Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining a 
product-by-process claim as “[a] patent claim defining a product through 
the process by which it is made”). 
21. Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 115, 117 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 
9,472), aff'd, 94 U.S. 568 (1876). 
22. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 571.  
23. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 571.  
24. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 572 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 90,284 (issued May 18, 
1869)).  
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 570. 
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place in the specification, Merrill had used the word “manufacture” in 
a way that unambiguously referred to a process,27 but a word having 
two meanings could properly be used within the same document to have 
one of its meanings in one sentence and the other meaning in a different 
sentence. In sum, the Court’s contextual arguments are suggestive but 
not dispositive. 
Third and finally, the Court made a structural argument about the 
patent specification, which the Court describes as being “almost wholly 
directed to the apparatus, the mode of using it, and the peculiar process 
of distillation.”28 “Why should this be so,” the Court asked rhetorically, 
“if the applicant for the patent was only looking to the products as his 
invention,—the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils?”29 The Court 
concluded that “[i]f the oil alone was to be patented, by whatever 
process made, this elaborate description of one particular process was 
unnecessary.”30 That’s very clearly the Court’s worst argument, for the 
Patent Act then (and still today) requires a complete disclosure of “the 
manner and process of making” an invention.31 Thus, even if Merrill 
intended to claim a product (the deodorized oils), he was still required 
by law to disclose the details of how to make the product. 
The main point here is not to relitigate the proper interpretation of 
the word “manufacture” in the context of Merrill’s patent, nor to argue 
that the outcome in the case was wrong. Indeed, given the Merrill’s 
disclaimer of a product-by-process interpretation, the Court seems 
correct in rejecting a claim interpretation that would have given Merrill 
rights to all deodorized heavy oils however produced. The most 
important point for purposes of this article is that, despite the opinion’s 
reference to the “well-settled rules” of the patent system, the Court 
cited not one authority providing a settled rule favoring its 
interpretation over the alternatives. Indeed, the entire Merrill opinion 
 
27. Id. at 572 (noting that, in the sentence beginning “[i]n carrying on my new 
manufacture of deodorizing heavy oils with this apparatus, I place the oil 





31. Patent Act of 1836, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (requiring disclosure of “the manner 
and process of making” the invention in “full, clear, and exact terms”); 35 
U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018) (requiring disclosure of “the manner and process of 
making” the invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms”). Note that, 
although Merrill was decided after the enactment of the 1870 Patent Act, 
the 1836 Patent Act would have still applied to the patent in the case, as 
it was issued prior to the enactment of the 1870 Act.  
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contains no citations to any authority whatsoever—no case cites, no 
treatises, no administrative rulings, no statutes, nothing. 32  
That omission of authority was not an oversight on the Court’s 
part. Attorneys of that era who sought guidance on how to write claims 
would find little authoritative help, and on the issue specifically 
relevant to the outcome in Merrill, the law would be filled with 
uncertainty for more than a century.  
At the time Merrill’s patent issued, the Patent Office had given 
almost no guidance on claiming. The agency’s then-existing pamphlet 
of rules, published on August 1, 1867, includes no separate section for 
rules governing claims or claim format.33 By contrast, the rules 
pamphlet does include separate sections for “Drawings” and “Model[s],” 
each of which contains detailed rules such as a rule requiring drawings 
to be “fifteen inches from top to bottom, and ten inches across” and 
another rule requiring models to be “made of durable material, and not 
more than one foot in length or in height, unless a larger model is 
necessary to exhibit the invention.”34 
The rules on claiming, to the extent that the pamphlet can be 
viewed as having any such rules, are contained entirely in the ten 
rules—barely two pages of text—governing the form and content of the 
specification. The first of those rules states merely that “[t]he applicant 
must set forth in his specification the precise invention for which he 
claims a patent.”35 The next rule governs “improvements” and warns 
that “the specification”—not the claims—“must distinguish between 
what is admitted to be old and what is described and claimed to be the 
improvement.”36 Two rules describe the agency’s general policy against 
including separate inventions in the same application, with the agency 
warning that it could require the applicant to “divide” an application 
containing multiple inventions, but granting an exception permitting 
multiple inventions in one application where they “have a necessary 
and dependent connection with each other.”37 The fifth rule states 
 
32. See Merrill, 94 U.S. at 568–74 (citing no authority of any kind). Two 
passages referring to (but not citing) the “act of Congress” and its require–
ment that a patent applicant include a “statement of his invention”—i.e., “a 
distinct and specific statement of what he claims to be new, and to be his 
invention”—are the closest the Court comes to citing any authority in its 
opinion. Id. at 569–70. 
33. See U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the 
Patent Office (Aug. 1, 1867) [hereinafter 1867 Patent Rules] (setting 
forth the complete set of rules governing the form and contents of a patent 
application). 
34. Id. at 12 (rule 20) & at 13 (rule 23). 
35. Id. at 10 (rule 10). 
36. Id. (rule 11). 
37. Id. (rules 12 & 13). 
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requirements for the application to be signed by the inventor or agent 
and for the specification to describe any drawings, and it concludes with 
two short examples of specifications, only one of which is complete.38 
The final five rules provide details about the signatures and oaths 
required for filing the application.39 
The two exemplary specifications set forth with the rule provide 
little information about claim drafting. The first example shows a short 
but complete specification for “a new and improved mode of preventing 
steam-boilers from bursting.”40 Both that introductory sentence and the 
claim appear to be directed to a process, with the claim of the example 
reading: 
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters 
patent, is the application to steam-boilers of a fusible alloy which 
will melt at a given temperature and allow the steam to escape, 
as herein described, using for that purpose the aforesaid metallic 
compound, or any other substantially the same, and which will 
produce the intended effect.41 
Yet elsewhere in the exemplary specification, the disclosure reads 
as if the inventor views the invention as a machine—a “steam-boiler”—
not a process for making steam-boilers safe. For example, the 
specification states that “[t]o enable others skilled in the art to make 
and use my invention, I will proceed to describe its construction and 
operation”42 and then the specification includes a narrative from the 
inventor explaining how “I construct my steam-boiler . . . ,”43 which 
reads as if the invention being made is the boiler itself. In sum, the 
exemplary specification seems to vary in describing the invention as a 
process and as a machine. 
The second example of a specification is incomplete. It instructs 
how to “commence” the specification covering a machine, but the 
example merely describes the claim for a machine by saying it “should 
express the nature and character of the invention, and identify the parts 
claimed separately or in combination.”44 In addition, a single short 
sentence notes that, “[i]f the specification is for an improvement, the 
 
38. See id. at 10–11 (rule 14). 
39. Id. at 11–12 (rules 15–19). 
40. Id. at 10. 
41. Id. at 11. 
42. Id. at 10. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 11. 
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original invention should be disclaimed, and the claim confined to the 
improvement.”45 
The agency generated a bit more guidance on claim writing in a 
new rule pamphlet published on August 1, 1869.46 Though that 
pamphlet did not issue until three months after the patent at issue in 
Merrill, it is still relevant because, if the agency had given clear 
guidance about the rules for claiming compositions of matter, Merrill’s 
attorneys would still have had time prior to initiating litigation against 
Yeomans to seek a reissued patent clarifying the patent’s claims. 
Merrill’s attorneys would not have thought to seek reissue, however, 
because the rules governing claiming were once again essentially 
nonexistent in the 1869 pamphlet.47 The new rule book did contain an 
appendix setting forth three brief examples for specifications covering 
utility patents, including one directed to a “process” and another 
directed to a “composition of matter” (see Figure 1 for the complete 
example of the specification for a composition of matter).48 If Merrill’s 
attorneys had looked at those examples, they would been reasonably 
confident that they had succeeded in claiming a composition of matter, 




46. U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the 
Patent Office (Aug. 1, 1869) [hereinafter 1869 Patent Rules].  
47. As before, no separate section provides rules on claims, even though 
separate sections provide rules governing the specification, the drawings and 
the model. Id. at 4–7 (rules 10–30). The rules governing specifications are 
nearly identical to those in the 1867 pamphlet, except the number of rules 
is decreased from ten to eight by combining some of rules governing oaths. 
Compare id. at 4–5, with 1867 Patent Rules, supra note 33, at 10–12. 
48. 1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 29–30. The other example for 
specifications covers a “machine.” Id. at 27. 
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Figure 1: The Exemplary Patent Specification and Claim 
for a Composition of Matter Set Forth in the Patent Office’s 
1869 Rules Pamphlet 
 
The exemplary claim for a process expressly uses the word “process” 
and immediately couples it (through the word “of”) with a gerund 
(“applying”) to signify a step in doing something. It reads: 
Claim.  
We claim as our invention the process of preparing the lime as 
set forth, and of applying it, when newly slacked and warm, to 
wheat, before passing the latter through a smut-mill, so as to 
cleanse the wheat from all impurities, substantially as described.49 
That claim looks nothing like Merrill’s. By contrast, the model 
claim for a composition of matter looks very much like Merrill’s claim, 
for it begins by describing the invention as a “manufacture” “of” a 
physical product. The claim reads: 
 
49. Id. at 29. 
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Claim. 
I claim as my invention the manufacture or preparation of a 
compound, which I denominate wool oil, of the ingredients, in the 
proportions, and for the purposes set forth.50 
Three additional features of this sample claim deserve special 
attention. First, the thing claimed is described as either the 
“manufacture” or the “preparation” of a compound. Both of those 
words in their noun forms can mean either the process of making or 
preparing a thing or the thing that is made or prepared. In both cases, 
the dominant usage of each word in the nineteenth century was to refer 
to the process, with the thing produced being a secondary meaning.51  
Yet the dominant usage of the word “manufacture” in U.S. patent 
law was different, or at least that was the view of the then most 
prominent treatise on the subject. The 1867 edition of George Curtis's 
treatise on patent law noted that, while in English patent law the word 
“manufacture” had come to mean both the process of making articles 
and the articles so made, that meaning did not carry over to the U.S. 
patent law. 52 Because the U.S. “made an enumeration of the different 
classes of subjects which in England are held to be patentable, it is to 
be presumed that this term [“manufacture”] was used to describe one 
of these classes only, namely, fabrics or substances made by the art or 
industry of man.”53 Thus, in U.S. patent law, a “manufacture” was 
“presumed” to cover not processes (or, the contemporaneous word, 
“arts”), but instead the “substances” made by those arts. 
Second, the final portion of the claim—“for the purposes set 
forth”—literally restricts the claim to covering the manufacture only 
 
50. Id. at 30. 
51. The best source for proving this point is the 1893 Funk & Wagnalls 
Dictionary. See 1 & 2 A Standard Dictionary of the English 
Language (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1893) [hereinafter Standard Dictionary]. 
That dictionary was published less than a quarter century after the 1869 
rules, and importantly, its “sense order rule”—the rule by which it presented 
numbered definitions of a word—was not “historical order” but was instead 
that “the most common meaning has been given first.” 1 id. at xi. For 
manufacture in its use as a noun, the dictionary gives as its first definition, 
“The operation of making articles for use by working on or combining 
material; the production of goods, etc., by industrial processes or art . . . .” 
2 id. at 1078. For “preparation,” the first entry is “[t]he act of preparing or 
fitting for some use or purpose . . . .” 2 id. at 1404. The highest ranked 
definition for the thing being produced is the fourth, which defines 
preparation as “[s]omething made or prepared, especially a compound, 
concoction, or composition.” Id. 
52. See George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents §§ 25–27, at 
19–21 (1867).  
53. Id. § 27, at 20.  
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when it is used for specific purposes. Even if “manufacture” is 
interpreted to be a composition of matter, modern patent law would 
view a claim to a composition for certain purposes or uses as covering 
a process, as § 100(b) of the Patent Act expressly defines a claim 
directed to a particular “use of a . . . composition of matter” as being 
a process claim.54 
Third, the grammar of the claim could easily be seen as pointing 
toward the claim covering a process, not a composition. The claim does 
not say it is directed to “the manufacture or preparation, which is 
denominated wool oil”—a format in which “manufacture or 
preparation” would unambiguously be the product, the wool oil. It 
instead claims “the manufacture or preparation of a compound, which 
is denominated wood oil, . . . .” The wool oil is the “compound” or 
composition of matter, and the claim is directed to the “manufacture 
or preparation” of that compound. Reading the claim as a process seems 
even more appropriate given the most common definition of 
preparation, which is “[t]he act of preparing or fitting for some use or 
purpose.”55 Interpreting “preparation” as an act of preparing explains 
why “for the purposes set forth” appears later in the claim. This 
problem with the exemplary claim seems to have been eventually 
detected by the Patent Office, for in its 1871 rules pamphlet, it 
eliminated the “manufacture or preparation” language and directed the 
claim to cover simply “a compound.”56 But that change happened after 
two years of publishing versions of the pamphlet with the model claim 
for a composition of matter being directed to “the manufacture or 
preparation of a compound.”57 And of course, the change in guidance 
happened more than a year after Merrill had initiated the infringement 
litigation against Yeomans. 
In sum, the Patent Office’s contemporaneous guidance for inventors 
and attorneys seeking to claim a composition of matter reads at least 
as much like a process claim as the claim in Merrill. Yet the Patent 
Office's publication of such a claim as a model for composition of matter 
claims would not have alerted reasonable attorneys of the era that 
 
54. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2018) (defining “process” to “include[] a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material”). 
55. Standard Dictionary, supra note 51, at 1404 (emphasis added). 
56. U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the 
Patent Office, at 39 (Aug. 1, 1871). The new version of the example reads: 
“I claim, as the invention of the said [hypothetical inventor], a compound 
composed of any of the oils ordinarily used on wool in its manufacture, and a 
solution of oil soap, substantially in the proportions and for the purposes set 
forth.” Id. 
57. In addition to the 1869 Rules, the agency's 1870 rules pamphlet included 
the same language. See U.S. Pat. Off., Rules and Directions for 
Proceedings in the Patent Office, at 35 (July 15, 1870). 
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inclusion of some process language would undermine any attempt to 
claim a composition of matter as a new manufacture. With hindsight, 
the claim's flaws might be obvious, but hindsight can be deceptive in 
making the hidden seem clear.  
If the Patent Office’s hypothetical claim for a composition of matter 
contains flaws, the source material for that claim is even worse. The 
Patent Office’s hypothetical specification and claim was modeled on an 
actual 1855 patent which, like the exemplary specification set forth in 
the 1869 Office rules, begins with an unequivocal assertion that the 
inventor believes himself to have invented a new thing, not a process 
(see Figure 2 for the complete specification of the actual 1855 patent).58  
 
Figure 2: The 1855 Patent on “Wool-Oil” Selected by the 
Patent Office as the Basis for the Model Specification and 
Claim Set Forth in the Agency’s 1869 Rule Pamphlet 
 
 
58. Compare U.S. Patent No. 12,964, at 1 (filed May 29, 1855), with 1869 
Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30. 
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The inventor asserts that he “ha[s] invented a new and improved 
compound oil, called ‘Wool-Oil,’ to be used in the manufacture of wool 
in the place of olive, lard, rape-seed, or other oils.”59 Yet that claim 
even more clearly seems to read like a process: 
 What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by Letters 
Patent, is— 
 The manufacture or preparation of a compound which I 
denominate “wool-oil,” of the ingredients in the manner and for 
the purpose set forth.60 
That claim seems to incorporate process conditions governing both 
the making and the using of the compound, for the claim it covers the 
manufacture of a compound “in the manner” and “for the purpose” set 
forth in the patent. To the extent that the Merrill Court was asserting 
that patent law had “settled rules” not being followed by Merrill and 
his attorneys, the very patent claim selected by the Patent Office as an 
example—both in its original form and as modified by the agency in its 
rule pamphlet—shows the absence of certainty about claiming 
practices. 
In addition to the problems in its claim language, the Patent 
Office’s exemplary specification has the same inconsistencies identified 
by the Supreme Court in Merrill’s specification. The exemplary 
specification uses the word “manufacture” twice in sentences where the 
word could refer only to a process, not to a product.61 And just as in 
Merrill’s specification, the exemplary specification describes the 
relevant “invention” in process terms, stating that “[t]he nature of [the] 
invention . . . consists in mixing [various ingredients] with a solution of 
oil soap dissolved in hot water.”62 That sentence sounds like a recipe, 
and recipes are fundamentally processes—a series of steps toward 
making a product. Yet the Patent Office’s example demonstrates that 
inventors in 1869 could reasonably have claimed their inventions as a 
 
59. U.S. Patent No. 12,964, at 1 (filed May 29, 1855). The hypothetical 
specification in the 1869 rule begins with the highly similar assertion that 
the inventor (the agency used a pseudonym) “invented a certain compound 
called ‘wool oil,’ to be used instead of lard, rape-seed, or other oils, in the 
manufacture of wool.” 1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30. 
60. Id. 
61. See 1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 30 (referring in separate 
sentences to oil “used . . . in the manufacture of wool” and oil “used on 
wool in the process of its manufacture”). In both sentences, “manufacture” 
must bear its meaning as a process, even though “manufacture” in the 
claim is supposed to refer to a composition of matter. 
62. Id. 
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recipe for making a new product and still believed that they were 
obtaining patent rights covering the new product itself. 
Examining the Patent Office’s contemporary guidance on 
claiming—to the extent that the Patent Office had given any 
guidance—shows that the Merrill Court was being unrealistic in 
demanding that inventors exercise “accuracy, precision, and care in the 
preparation of all the papers on which the patent is founded.”63 In 
making that demand, the Court emphasized the importance of both the 
public’s interest in “being clearly told what it is that limits [the public’s] 
rights” and later inventors’ interests in being free to make new 
improvements without being “restrained by vague and indefinite 
descriptions of claims in existing patents.”64 Yet those interests cannot 
be well served if, as seems nearly certain, the patent claim held out by 
the Patent Office as a model for protecting a composition of matter 
would not have been held to cover a composition of matter under the 
Court’s analysis. Moreover, interests in providing public notice of 
patent rights must be balanced against the interests of inventors in 
being able to protect their inventions even though they have access to 
lawyers possessing only ordinary skill in the art of patent law. Those 
lawyers should not be expected to do a job better than even the Patent 
Office of the time could do. 
The briefing in Merrill provides a final and ultimate indication of 
how little certainty there was in claiming practices at the time of 
Merrill. In over 300 pages of combined briefing to the Supreme Court, 
neither party to the litigation even bothers citing to the Court the 
Patent Office’s guidance on claiming.65 This surprising fact is true even 
though “wool oil”—the subject matter of the hypothetical composition 
of matter claim in the Patent Office’s 1869 rule pamphlet—happens to 
be a related technology to Merrill’s deodorized oil, so wool oil itself is 
mentioned more than 20 times in the depositions and briefs that form 
the record of the case at the Supreme Court.66 Furthermore, what are 
today basic concepts of patent law are shown to be uncertain at the 
time. Thus, for example, the defendants in the case argued it 
“questionable as a matter of law, whether there can be a patent for a 
new article however made.”67 If there were “settled rules” of patent law 
that would allow the public to perceive “clearly” the limits of patent 
 
63. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876). 
64. Id. 
65. See Brief for Appellees, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209); 
Appellant’s Brief, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (No. 209); Supplementary 
Brief for Appellants, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209). 
66. See Transcript of Record, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 573 (1877) (No. 209) 
(searching “wool oil,” yields 28 instances of the phrase).  
67. Brief for Appellees at 8, Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876) (No. 209) 
(emphasis in original). 
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rights, the parties to the Merrill litigation, and the Patent Office itself, 
were not capable of finding or articulating them. 
The Merrill Court's reference to the “settled rules” of patent law 
is, however, subject to one interpretation that makes sense of the entire 
opinion in the proper historical context. In the whole of its opinion, the 
Court refers to only one principle or doctrine of patent law that the 
Court itself describes as a “rule.” That rule, which the Court recognizes 
as supported court precedents cited by the parties (but uncited in the 
Court’s opinion), is that, “where it appears that a valuable invention 
has really been made, this court, giving full effect to all that is found 
in the application on which the Patent Office acted, will uphold that 
which was really invented, and which comes within any fair inter–
pretation of the patentee's assertion of claim.”68 The Court expressly 
states that “this rule”—that claims should be interpreted, if fairly 
possible, to cover what is “really invented”—is being followed in the 
case. That passage in the Court’s opinion provides the best key to 
understanding what core rule of patent law was relevant to the case 
and was really settled at the time of Merrill. It was not a rule about 
the style or format of writing claims; it was a rule about how courts 
should approach construing claims in light of the actual technological 
contributions disclosed by the inventor. 
 Merrill’s contribution in the field was in developing a process 
to deodorize heavy oils and in using that process to produce a product. 
But as the Court noted early in its opinion, Merrill was able to describe 
the article produced—to the extent he could describe it not in terms of 
the process by which it is made—only “in short terms” with the “main 
feature” of the article described as being “its freedom from the offensive 
odor which, before his invention, seemed to be an inseparable quality 
of those oils.”69 If omniscient attorneys had tried to write a pure product 
claim—i.e., not a product-by-process claim—to cover such a product, 
could they have done so based on Merrill’s then-existing knowledge of 
the product? The answer is almost certainly “no.”  
 Merrill’s knowledge of the product, as disclosed in the patent 
specification, encompassed two facts. First, the product was produced 
by his process. Second, the product had a functionally desirable 
feature—it did not smell bad. The first fact would support a product-
by-process claim, but as the trial court's decision proved, such a claim 
would not help Merrill win his case (and hence his attorneys disclaimed 
that interpretation of the actual claim in the Supreme Court). If the 
product is not defined by the process that made it, it could be defined 
only by the functional feature—the lack of an offensive odor. Yet 
 
68. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.  
69. Id. at 569.  
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compositions of matter, just like other inventions, cannot be defined in 
purely functional terms.  
 That last point is clear today, and backed up by multiple 
Supreme Court decisions condemning purely functional claiming both 
generally and in composition of matter claims.70 Indeed, the section of 
the modern Patent Act governing claim format (§ 112) permits 
attorneys to define a claim element in terms of its ability to perform a 
function only if that element is not the only element in the claim, and 
then still the functional claim language is limited by the means or steps 
for performing the function that are disclosed in the patent’s 
specification.71  
 Yet even in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
ability of an inventor to claim a composition of matter solely in terms 
of its function was doubtful at best. For example, Robinson’s 1890 
patent law treatise states that a composition of matter claim had to 
disclose the elements of the composition and “the mode of their 
union.”72 To back up that point, Robinson relied on the 1868 Goodyear 
v. Berry case for the proposition that “a Claim for a chemical 
composition covers only the same use of the same or equivalent 
ingredients.”73 The Goodyear v. Berry court was even more clear on the 
point, stating that, for patented chemical compositions, “the exclusive 
right to the invention imports nothing but protection against the use 
of the same, or substantially the same elements compounded and treated 
on principles substantially the same as those of the patented article.”74 
The court summed up the point by stating that “a patent right does 
not cover every possible mode of accomplishing the result proposed by 
an inventor.”75  
 
70. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) 
(invalidating a “functional claim” due to its “broadness, ambiguity, and 
overhanging threat”); General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 
U.S. 364, 371(1938) (invalidating a claim for using “conveniently functional 
language at the exact point of novelty”); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins 
Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (rejecting the idea that a composition of 
matter claim can be defined “by describing the product exclusively in terms 
of its use or function”).  
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See also Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent 
Law and Policy 39–40 (8th ed. 2021) (discussing the limitations of § 112(f) 
including the prohibition on “single means” claims—claims with only one 
element defined in functional terms). 
72. 2 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents § 532, at 148 (1890). 
73. Id. § 532 n.3, at 148 (emphasis added) (citing Goodyear v. Berry, 10 F. Cas. 
631 (C.C.D. S. Ohio 1868) (No. 5,556)). 
74. Goodyear, 10 F. Cas. at 635 (emphasis added).  
75. Id.  
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 Thus, the best view of the Court’s decision in Merrill is that 
the Court followed its settled rule of matching patent rights to what 
the inventor “really invented.” For Merrill’s invention, that rule meant 
rights to a process or to a product-by-process, neither of which would 
win Merrill his infringement case against Yeomans. If Merrill wanted 
more—if he wanted to push the envelope of what he could possibly 
claim given his technological contribution—the Court suggested that 
he should “surrender” his current patent and seek a “reissue.”76 That 
administrative procedure would have allowed the Patent Office to pass 
on whether Merrill could define his product—his deodorized heavy 
oils—in some acceptable way that did not rely on the process for 
making it and that did not describe the product in purely functional 
terms. 
II. Developments After Merrill: Continued 
Uncertainty in Claiming 
Merrill raised the prominence of claims, but it would be a major 
mistake to believe that the rising importance of claims produced more 
certainty in claiming practices. For decades after Merrill declared 
claims as “of primary importance” in defining patent rights, the Patent 
Office continued to include essentially no meaningful rules about 
claiming even while it continued to have, for example, multiple rules 
covering the formatting of drawings. 
The agency’s rule pamphlets continued to provide examples, but 
just as the 1869 example for claiming a composition of matter probably 
was not reliable, other exemplary claims contained some nasty surprises 
for attorneys who followed them. For example, from 1869 onward, the 
agency’s exemplary claims for machines had always included reference 
letters relating the elements of the claims to the drawings. For example, 
one machine claim in the agency's 1888 rule pamphlet reads: “The 
combination, in a meat-chopping machine, of the reciprocating rod H, 
carrying the knives d d, the cross-head C, . . . .”77 While that 
convention was not required by rule—the rules said only that the 
“description” in the specification had to include references to the 
drawings “by letters or numerals”78—the vast majority of applicants 
 
76. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.  
77. U.S. Pat. Off., Rules of Practice in the United States Patent 
Office 70 (Apr. 18, 1888). 
78. Id. at 12. The 1869 rules had also not required claims to have reference 
letters but had instead said merely that the “specification should describe 
the drawings, . . . and refer by letters and figures to the different parts.” 
1869 Patent Rules, supra note 46, at 5. 
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followed the agency’s exemplary machine claim and included letters to 
connect the claim elements to the drawings.79 
That practice, though encouraged by the Patent Office’s claim 
examples, declined swiftly following the Supreme Court’s 1888 decision 
in Weir v. Morden, which used the presence of such reference characters 
to narrow a claim based on the particular configuration of the elements 
shown in the drawings.80 The inventor in that case otherwise had a 
pretty good argument for a broader construction of the claim based on 
the claim’s text and the principle of “claim differentiation.”81 The 
drawing references, however, led to a narrow interpretation and a 
complete loss in the infringement litigation for the inventor.82 A dozen 
years after Weir, only 22% of claims included such references to the 
drawings; two decades later, the practice was nonexistent.83 
While providing little or no guidance in the form of rules, the 
Patent Office was continuing after 1869 to provide a stream of 
published decisions by the Commissioner (then the agency’s head) 
concerning issues of patent law, including the proper form and scope of 
patent claims.84 To be sure, most Commissioner decisions did not 
concern patent claims. Issues addressed included points on novelty, 
interferences, patent term extensions, joint inventorship, the format for 
oaths and internal office procedure.85 Still, over the course of decades, 
administrative decisions became an important source of precedents 
concerning the style and substance of claims. 
Commissioner decisions were, however, much like judicial decisions 
in the sense that they were always counterpunches. Patent attorneys 
were the first movers. They had to decide on format, scope, and number 
of claims. They were the ones innovating, not the agency and not the 
courts. 
Moreover, the agency was a middle-tier player. Unlike the courts, 
the agency could not definitively rule on the propriety of a format or, 
 
79. See Ridsdale Ellis, Patent Claims § 6, at 7 (1949) (setting forth data 
showing 83% of claims in 1880 included reference characters connecting 
claim elements to the drawings). 
80. 125 U.S. 98, 107 (1888). 
81. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 71, at 660–64 (discussing the use of, and 
limitation on, the canon of “claim differentiation,” which creates a general 
presumption that different claims should be interpreted to have different 
scopes). 
82.  Id. at 107–08. 
83. See Ellis, supra note 79, § 6, at 7 (setting forth data showing 22% of 
claims in 1900, and 0% in 1920, included drawing reference characters in 
the claims). 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
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as in the case of including drawing references in claims, on the 
consequences of that format.86 That position meant that the agency was 
generally willing to give attorneys substantial latitude in choosing not 
only the number of claims (as discussed below in Part III), but also the 
format. For example, an early Commissioner decision made clear that 
the use of drawing references in claims was optional only—an option 
that many patentees would (wisely) decline after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Weir.87 
Precisely because the agency did not, and perhaps could not, create 
and maintain settled rules about patent claiming, certainty on any 
particular point was elusive. Once again, the patent in Merrill provides 
a good example of that continuing uncertainty. 
Though the Supreme Court held the claim at issue in Merrill to be 
a product claim, that interpretation was not obviously correct. The trial 
court in Merrill interpreted the claim to be directed to a product, but 
only to the product as produced by a particular process. The trial judge 
reasoned that it was permissible for a patentee “to claim broadly the 
new product, however made, or to claim the new product when made 
by a described process.”88 That latter interpretation, the judge opined, 
“is the only one which appears to us to be admissible, and the only one 
consistent with the language used by the patentee, and one which most 
effectually, probably, secures to him the product of his invention.”89 
Under that interpretation, Merrill claimed “a heavy hydrocarbon oil 
having the characteristics described in the patent, and produced by 
treating the oils in the manner described in the patent.”90 Because the 
defendant in the case had not used oils that had been produced in the 
manner disclosed by Merrill, the infringement case failed.91 
At the Supreme Court, Merrill’s attorneys chose to “disclaim” that 
claim interpretation.92 Both Merrill’s attorneys and the Court focused 
 
86. See id. 
87. Ex parte Parker, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 293, 294 (holding that a patent 
examiner was wrong to require the claims to include letters of reference to 
the drawings because it was a “fallacy” to believe that “by the use of these 
letters the scope of the claim can be more accurately defined than by the 
use of proper descriptive words”). The Commissioner also opined that the 
letters of reference were “for convenience merely, and in themselves have no 
significance.” Id. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Weir would 
prove the Commission wrong on that final point. See Weir v. Morden, 125 
U.S. 98, 108 (1888). 
88. Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 9,472). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 117. 
92. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 571 (1876). 
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attention on the meaning of “manufacture,” but that framing of the 
case obscured a point of uncertainty that would persist for more than 
a century.93 
What modern attorneys would call a product-by-process claim 
would eventually be expressly blessed as “proper” by the Commissioner 
of Patents in the 1891 decision Ex parte Painter.94 That decision 
concerned a patent claim in which “each clause claims an article 
qualified by the process of making it,” and the Commissioner considered 
the patent examiner’s objection to the claim as resting on the view that 
“a claim may never define an article of manufacture by any reference 
to the manner of making it.”95 In rejecting the examiner’s position, the 
Commissioner reasoned that, although “as a rule a claim for an article 
of manufacture should not be defined by the process of producing that 
article,” there was an “exception to the rule” where an “article cannot 
be properly defined and discriminated from the prior art otherwise than 
by reference to the process of producing it.”96 
The Commissioner’s decision in Painter would eventually become a 
standard citation in court opinions and treatises for the propriety of 
product-by-process claims,97 but four points highlight the degree to 
which the Commissioner of Patents was not leading the development 
of settled rules about claiming.  
First, the Painter decision was actually overruling an earlier 
Commissioner decision that was not even 15 years old. The 1877 Ex 
parte Cobb decision had recognized the supposedly “invariable 
requirement of the Commissioner that from a claim for a new ‘article 
of manufacture’ there shall be eliminated all reference to the process” 
employed in making the article.98 The 1891 Painter decision acknowl–
edged this prior agency precedent (while avoiding actually citing the 
earlier decision) but disparaged the precedent on the ground that the 
judicial decisions cited by Cobb did not support any rule against 
defining a product by the process of making it.99 Cobb and Painter 
together demonstrate the unsettled state of rules governing claiming. 
Second, though left entirely unmentioned in the agency’s Painter 
decision, the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in Smith v. Goodyear  
93. Id. at 570–72. 
94. 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 200, 200. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 200–01. 
97. See Ellis, supra note 79, § 449 at 565 (citing Painter as the “earliest case” 
holding that a “product may be defined by its process of manufacture when 
there is no other satisfactory method of defining it”). 
98. 1874 Dec. Comm’n Pat. 60, 60.  
99. Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’n Pat. at 200 (citing the two judicial precedents 
also cited in Cobb). 
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Dental Vulcanite Co. had squarely held that an invention could be 
defined as “a product or manufacture made in a defined manner.”100 
The claim at issue in Smith did not expressly include process terms. 
Rather, it was merely in the format of a specific product “substantially 
as described.”101 The Smith Court interpreted that “substantially as 
described” clause as implicitly limiting the claimed product to only a 
product produced using the process set for the patent specification. Yet 
if the Supreme Court could hold that the product claim without any 
express process limitations may be implicitly limited to a product 
produced by a specific process, there would seem to be no good reason 
why patent attorneys could not draft claims expressly claiming products 
produced by a process.  
Third, the Painter decision began its analysis by relying on a 
judicial decision, although oddly enough that judicial decision was not 
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Smith v. Goodyear Dental 
Vulcanite. Instead, Painter relied on the 1884 circuit court decision in 
Globe Nail Co. v. U.S. Horse Nail Co., which had involved a claim to 
a nail that was defined by a series of process steps (e.g., “made by 
punching or cutting from hot-rolled ribbed bars of metal”) capable of 
“produc[ing] the peculiar qualities specified.”102 The Commissioner was 
not, however, relying on any holding of the court because, as the 
Commissioner’s decision expressly notes, “no question was made but 
that it was a proper claim.”103 In other words, the judges did not 
consider the propriety of the claim format because the attorneys for the 
defendant did not challenge it (quite possibly because they were aware 
of Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite). Thus, in relying on the form 
of the claim in Globe Nail, the Commissioner was relying not on the 
1884 judicial decision in the case (because the judges were never 
presented arguments about the claim’s format), but on (1) an 1869 
decision of a private attorney to draft the claim in that format,104 (2) 
the contemporaneous decision of an examiner to allow the claim in that 
 
100. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1877). 
101. Id. (quoting U.S. Pat. Re. 1,904 (1865)).  
102. 19 F. 819, 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884). The complete claim, which was also 
set forth in the Painter decision, is: 
A nail made by punching or cutting from hot-rolled ribbed bars of 
metal a headed blank, substantially as described, and by elongating, 
hardening, and compressing the shanks of such blanks by cold-
rolling from the head to the point, thereby giving to all parts of the 
nail so produced the peculiar qualities specified. 
 Id.; see also Ex parte Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 200 (quoting the 
claim). 
103. Ex parte Painter, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 200. 
104. See U.S. Patent No. 92,355 (filed July 6, 1869). 
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format, and (3) the litigation decision of the defendants in Globe Nail 
to forego challenging the format of the patent claim. In sum, patent 
lawyers were using the product-by-process claim format long before the 
Commissioner’s 1891 decision to accept the format. 
Fourth, the Commissioner’s Painter decision did not, and could not, 
control how such a product-by-process claim would be interpreted in 
infringement litigation. For more than a century, two views percolated 
through the courts and commentators. The first and dominant view 
was that such a claim was infringed only if the accused product was 
proven as having been produced by the process mentioned in the 
claim.105 An alternative view was that a product-by-process claim was 
every bit as broad as any other product claim and would be infringed 
by any product without regard to how it was produced.106 Under that 
latter theory, the process elements in the product-by-process claim were 
merely intended to define the product in cases where the structural 
features of the product could not be determined given the limitations 
in the existing technology. 
The historical conflict between those two views was finally resolved 
(or at least apparently so, assuming that the Supreme Court does not 
take up the issue) by an en banc decision of the Federal Circuit only in 
2009107—more than 130 years after the Merrill decision and more than 
a century after the Commissioner’s decision formally ratifying product-
by-process claims! The en banc decision embraced the view described 
above as the first and dominant view, but in doing so, it had to 
expressly overrule a 1991 panel decision applying the alternative view.108 
The en banc court was also not unanimous, with three of the longest-
tenured judges on the court dissenting.109 
In sum, the deep uncertainty surrounding the very claim format 
used in Merrill—and the survival of that uncertainty for more than a  
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1877); 
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 842 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (describing a line of cases holding that product-by-process claims 
inquiries focus “on whether the accused product was made by the claimed 
process”). 
106. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Rsch. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he correct reading of product-by-process claims 
is that they are not limited to product prepared by the process set forth in 
the claims.”).  
107. Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en 
banc). 
108. Id. at 1293 (embracing the rule “that the process terms limit product-by-
process claims” in infringement analyses and “expressly overrul[ing]” Scripps 
Clinic & Rsch. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
109. See id. at 1299 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer & Lourie, JJ., dissenting). At 
the time, Judges Newman and Mayer were the longest tenured judges on the 
court, and Judge Lourie was the fifth most senior judge. 
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century after the case—gives lie to Supreme Court’s assertion that 
patent law in 1877 had developed sufficiently “well-settled” rules that 
the patentee’s alternative interpretation of the patent claim could be as 
easily discounted as the Court had done. 110 This point is easy for 
modern commentators to overlook. For example, the claim in Merrill is 
used as an example in an article by Professors Chiang and Solum, who 
assert that “[o]nce read in context, it becomes quite clear that the word 
‘manufacture’ in the claim refers to a process and not a product.”111 In 
addition to context, they rely on the application of “some ordinary rules 
of grammar” to argue: 
A sentence that read, “I claim the above described new 
manufacture of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils . . . from [ 
untreated] hydrocarbon oils, by treating them substantially as is 
hereinbefore described,” would make no grammatical sense if 
“manufacture” was being used to denote a product. By 
considering the surrounding context and applying some ordinary 
rules of grammar, we can arrive at the correct linguistic 
meaning.112 
Is this really so? Do the rules of grammar quite clearly dictate such 
a meaning? There are three reasons to doubt that assertion. 
First, the trial judge in the case wrote a considered opinion in which 
he came to the opposite conclusion—that the claim covered a product 
not just a process—and he thought that conclusion was “the only one 
which appears to us to be admissible.”113 It is true that the trial judge 
believed that the claim covered only the product when produced by a 
particular process, so that the end result was the same (the 
infringement case failed). Yet still his “only … admissible” was quite 
different from the the “quite clear” linguistic meaning posited by 
Chiang and Solum. 
Second, Chiang and Solum do not cite any source for the “ordinary 
rules of grammar” supporting their interpretation, and it’s unlikely that 
any standard or widely used books of grammar available to sophis–
ticated lawyers and judges contain grammatical rules detailed enough 
to resolve the issue whether “manufacture,” in its meaning as a product, 
can properly be modified by the clauses “from hydrocarbon oils” and 
“by treating them . . . .” Indeed, it seems doubtful that such any such 
rule of grammar exists. The word “manufacture” is similar to a number 
of similar words such as building, creation, fabrication, preparation, 
 
110. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 US. 568, 573 (1877). 
111. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 Yale L.J. 530, 550 (2013). 
112. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 
(1876)). 
113. Merrill v. Yeomans, 17 F. Cas. 113, 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 9,472). 
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assembly, etc., each of which can mean the process of making a thing 
or the thing produced. Now consider this sentence: 
I claim the assembly of a beautiful puzzle, suitable for framing, 
from one hundred parts, by piecing them together. 
The object of that sentence could mean the process of assembly, 
but it can also refer to the finished product without violating any rules 
of grammar. To see this, add the adjective “completed” to the sentence 
so that it reads: 
I claim the completed assembly of a beautiful puzzle, suitable for 
framing, from one hundred parts, by piecing them together. 
The adjective “completed” resolves of the ambiguity so that the object 
is now clearly the product, but the sentence is still grammatically 
correct. 
Third, even where a particular claim has linguistic certainty, that 
certainty is not legally dispositive. The text of the relevant statute 
defines infringement as the unauthorized making, using, offering for 
sale, etc., of the “patented invention.”114 Nothing in that statute, or in 
the other general statutes governing the cause of action for infringe–
ment,115 state that “the patented invention” is defined exclusively by 
the claims. The case law confirms the contrary is true: defendants may 
infringe the patented invention even though they avoid the literal 
meaning of the claims116 and, conversely, may not infringe even though 
they act within the literal meaning of the claims.117 Thus, complete 
certainty in claiming—which was present neither in the time of Merrill 
nor in the present time—would not bring certainty in defining patent 
property rights. 
 
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). Chiang & Solum describe the schism between 
judges who pursue “the linguistic meaning of claim text” and those who 
seek “the true invention” as part of the “age-old conflict between textualism 
and anti-textualism.” Chiang & Solum, supra note 111, at 573. Yet in the 
context of an infringement case, judges who seek to find the “patented 
invention,” rather than the linguistic meaning of claim text, may be the real 
textualists because they are following the commands of § 271. 
115. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–82 (2018). 
116. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17–18 (1997) 
(holding a patent may be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents even 
when defendant’s activities avoid the literal language of the claims). 
117. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (holding 
that the patentee cannot hold the defendant liable for infringement even 
where the defendant has acted “within the letter” of the patent claims, if the 
defendant “has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of 
the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent [the patentee’s] 
actual invention”). 
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III. A Contemporaneous Solution to Uncertainty: The 
Multiplicity of Claims. 
Given the lack of settled rules for claiming, one of the most 
important decisions of the Patent Office was to allow a multiplicity of 
claims so that inventors’ attorneys could experiment with different 
claiming formats. That decision came in Ex parte Perry & Lay,118 which 
was rendered the same year, 1869, that Merrill received his patent. It 
was one of the earliest recorded decisions of the Commissioner of 
Patents (it was the second decision reported in the first volume of the 
series “Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents,” which would 
eventually span one century of volumes). The Commissioner there 
considered whether the seventh claim in an application for a reissued 
patent was properly “disallowed on the ground that it was substantially 
embraced in the first claim.”119 The Commissioner ruled that the ground 
“does not appear to me to be a valid objection” because “[i]t is 
admissible, upon proper restrictions, for parties to put their claims in 
different forms to prevent misconstructions of them by the public or by 
the courts.”120 
The reissue patent for Perry and Lay, which covered an improved 
marine reciprocating steam engine, issued on March 30, 1869, less than 
three months after the Commissioner’s decision.121 It contained seven 
claims, each set forth in a quite different format. Three of the seven 
claims seem equivalent to what a modern patent lawyer would call 
“dependent claims.” Each of those three begins with the word “Also,” 
and each provides additional details, elements and limitations relevant 
to a preceding claim.122 The four “independent” claims (claims 1, 2, 4 
& 7) claim the invention in varying formats. Claim 1 is set forth in a 
strikingly modern format, with a preamble naming the invention (“A 
vertical compound-engine”) followed by a transition word (“having”) 
and then followed by various elements (cylinders, a continuous piston-
rod, etc.) and the interrelations of those elements.123 Claims 2 and 4 are 
set forth in two variants of the now antiquated “combination” format, 
 
118. Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 3. 
119. Id. at 3. 
120. Id. 
121. See U.S. Patent No. 65,003, at 1 (issued Mar. 30, 1869) (entitling the patent 
“Improvement in Reciprocating Steam-Engines” and specifying in the 
patent’s first sentence that the invention involves “Marine Steam-Engines”). 
122. See id. at 2 (claims 3, 5 & 6). Claim 3 seems to qualify claim 2 by adding 
two new elements—a “sleeve” and a “packing-box”—and specifying the 
relation of those new elements to the engine cylinders introduced in claim 2. 
Id. Claims 5 and 6 similarly qualify the independent claim 4. Id.  
123. Id. 
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with claim 2 structured as “[t]he combination and arrangement of [one 
element] with [other elements],” and claim 4 structured as “[i]n 
combination with [several elements], the [additional element].”124 Claim 
7 specifies only the “sustaining part,” which appears to be the chief 
innovation in the patent, and then details that single part’s relationship 
with the other parts (e.g., the “the two cylinders” and the “piston-rod”) 
of a “marine engine.”125 
By modern standards, the reissue patent to Perry and Lay had a 
very modest number of claims, but in 1869, the inclusion of seven claims 
was on the high side for number of claims in a patent. Many patents 
still concluded with only a single claim.126 The Patent Office’s then-
existing rule pamphlet provided exemplary applications for only two 
inventions, each of which had only one claim.127 Indeed, in describing 
its example for a patent on a machine, the Patent Office pamphlet 
stated that the specification should conclude with “the claim,” in the 
singular.128 One rule only suggested that multiple claims were 
permissible. That rule generally provided that “[t]wo or more distinct 
and separate inventions may not be claimed in one application,” but it 
provided an exception that “where several inventions have a necessary 
and dependent connection with each other, so that all co-operate in 
attaining the end which is sought, they may be so claimed.”129 That 
rule did not, however, authorize either expressly or by implication that 
applicants could write redundant claims in differing formats. 
Of course, sophisticated practitioners would have been aware that 
the Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Morse had sustained seven of Morse’s 
eight claims, so there was obviously no per se bar to multiple claims.130 
Similarly, the 1837 statute justifying the O’Reilly Court’s decision to 
refuse to award Morse costs at least arguably contemplated multiple 
claims, although the statute was not worded as its modern descendant 
is. The modern version of the statute denying costs for infringement 
 
124. Id. at 2. 
125. Id. 
126. For examples of single-claim patents issued on the very same day as the 
Perry & Lay reissued patent, see, for example, U.S. Patent No. 88,431, at 
2 (filed Mar. 30, 1869); U.S. Patent No. 88,494, at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869); 
U.S. Patent No. 88,369, at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869); U.S. Patent No. 88,370, 
at 1 (filed Mar. 30, 1869). 
127. 1867 Patent Rules, supra note 33, at 10–11. The rules provided one 
complete example of an application covering a process, which ended with 
one claim. The other example, which was directed to a machine invention, 
merely described in words how the application should be written. 
128. Id. at 11. 
129. Id. at 10. 
130. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121–22 (1853). 
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plaintiffs, 35 U.S.C. § 288, is entitled “Action for infringement of a 
patent containing an invalid claim,” and its text plainly contemplates 
patents having multiple claims.131 The equivalent 1837 statute denied 
victorious plaintiffs costs if they failed to file “a disclaimer of all that 
part of the thing patented which was so claimed without right.”132 The 
phrasing of that statute could have been interpreted as permitting the 
disclaimer of a “part” rather than of a distinct claim among a 
multiplicity of claims. It was not until the Patent Act of 1870 that 
statutory law expressly contemplated multiple claims in a single 
patent.133 
The lawyers for Perry and Lay were obviously very good at their 
craft, for not only were they creative enough to write repetitive claims 
in different formats (and appeal a rejection when lower level officials 
tried to stop them from doing so), they also claimed the invention in 
quite different formats—one format that continues to thrive today 
(claim 1), another format that was used for decades before falling out 
of favor in the twentieth century (the combination format of claims 2 
and 4), and one format that was used in the mid-nineteenth century 
but seems to have lost popularity rather quickly (claim 7, which focused 
specifically on the innovative piece of the whole engine). 
The Commissioner’s decision in Perry & Lay—albeit very short—
also points out the most important reason for permitting redundant 
claims: the different formats provides insurance against “miscon–
structions of them . . . by the courts.”134 The decision, however, did not 
give attorneys carte blanche to multiply claims, as it allowed redundant 
claims only with “proper restrictions.”135 In the decades following that 
decision, the Patent Office, the courts, and the practicing bar would 
struggle to find the correct balance between providing freedom for 
attorneys to write claims in creative ways and imposing “proper 
restrictions” on excessively numerous claims. 
 
131. 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018) (forbidding the awarding of costs to a plaintiff that 
prevails on an action for “infringement of a claim of the patent . . . unless a 
disclaimer of the invalid claim has been entered at the Patent and Trademark 
Office before the commencement of the suit”). Many other provisions of the 
modern Patent Act expressly contemplate multiple claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) 
(2018) (providing that the specification “shall conclude with one or more 
claims”); 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2018) (providing that “[e]ach claim of a 
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other 
claims”). 
132. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 45, § 9, 5 Stat. 191, 194 (emphasis added). 
133. See Act of July 8, 1870, cg. 230, § 46, 16 Stat. 198, 204–05 (permitting 
appeals for any of the “claims” twice rejected during examination). 
134. Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 3. 
135. Id. 
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Later in the same year as the Perry & Lay decision, the 
Commissioner rendered a decision placing one limit on including 
multiple claims in a single patent, but it was a very modest limit. In 
Ex parte Yale, the Commissioner ruled that the applicant could not 
place three claims into the same patent application where two were 
directed to a new mailbox and the third was directed to the lock on the 
box.136 As the Commissioner expressly stated, however, the rule was not 
designed to limit the number of potential claims but merely to prevent 
applicants from including “many inventions in one patent [so as to] 
deprive the Government of its proper fees.”137 The result was merely to 
require a division of the application, and the payment of an additional 
filing fee ($15 at the time).138 
Four years after the Commissioner’s decision in Perry & Lay, the 
Supreme Court in Carlton v. Bokee considered a reissued patent in 
which “[t]he single claim of the original patent is expanded into seven 
distinct claims.”139 The Carlton Court seemed to condemn the “needless 
multiplication” of claims in its statement that, “where a specification 
by ambiguity and a needless multiplication of nebulous claims is 
calculated to deceive and mislead the public, the patent is void.”140 But 
the statement was not a strong prohibition on patents having numerous 
claims. The Court’s wrath extended only to “needless” multiplication 
of “nebulous” claims that were “calculated to deceive and mislead,” and 
in that case, the Court found that the patentee had used the reissue 
process by “intersperse[ing]” within the patent’s original specification 
material that was “evidently borrowed from subsequent experience and 
events.”141 Indeed, the Court expressly stated that it was not deciding 
whether “a repetition of substantially the same claim in different words 
will vitiate a patent.”142 
Courts and commentators continued to condemn the presence of 
seemingly excessive claims in patents, but the practice grew. In a 1916 
opinion, the Second Circuit adopted as its own an opinion by then-
District Judge Learned Hand, who condemned a patent containing 48 
claims as “violat[ing] the very purpose of any claims at all, which is to 
 
136. Ex parte Linus Yale, Jr., 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 110. 
137. Id. at 111. 
138. Id. The Commissioner reminded readers that this fee was “a very reasonable 
charge” and that generally the U.S. fees for all services of the Patent Office 
“are less than are charged in any other country, while the service performed 
for the applicant by the office is much greater.” Id. 
139. 84 U.S. 463, 471 (1873). 
140. Id. at 472 (emphasis added). 
141. Id. at 471. 
142. Id. at 472. 
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define the forbidden field.”143 That statement was, however, dicta, as 
the court found the two claims asserted from the patent to be not 
infringed by the defendant’s product.144 Similarly, a 1922 treatise 
described a patent containing 277 claims as “a very close approach to 
the ridiculous” and opined that some reform was needed for “this gross 
abuse of practise to be consigned to oblivion.”145 Yet even that treatise 
writer recognized from his own practice experience the need for “claims 
of many kinds to protect adequately inventions” involving “modern 
complicated machinery.”146 Dissenting in a 1942 decision, Justice Black, 
joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, thought the Court’s 
statements in Carlton justified voiding a patent containing 137 claims 
with more words devoted to the claims (14,000) than to the whole rest 
of the patent (11,000).147 Nevertheless, the result in the case was that 
the Court majority held valid and infringed all five claims (out of the 
137) that had been asserted by the patentee.148 
By 1949, the mid-twentieth century’s leading treatise writer on 
patent claiming—Ridsdale Ellis—would note that, despite occasional 
judicial condemnations of patents with a large number of claims, “there 
are numerous cases of patents containing substantially duplicate claims 
being upheld without criticism or injuriously restricted interpre–
 
143. Victor Talking Mach. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 229 F. 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 
1916) (setting forth the district court opinion as the basis for affirmance). 
144. Id. 
145. John F. Robb, Patent Essentials for the Executive, Engineer, 
Lawyer and Inventor 201–02 (1922). The patent singled out in the 
treatise was U.S. Patent No. 1,043,882 (issued Nov. 12, 1912), which has 
less than seven pages of specification prior to the thirty-nine pages devoted 
to the 277 claims. Almost all of the claims are written in the “combination” 
format, with the first words in the claim being either “In a machine of the 
character described, the combination with . . . ” or “the combination of 
. . . ,” but a few claims are drafted in slightly different formats. Id. at 201; 
see U.S. Patent No. 1,043,882 (issued Nov. 12, 1912). 
146. Robb, supra note 145, at 207. The Robb treatise also believed that 
attorneys were multiplying claims excessively because they were “too fearful 
of failing to cover the invention properly” and were not “giv[ing] due weight 
to the fact that the courts exist to give effect to the protection of the patent 
for all real invention present.” Id. at 201–202. Yet, as Merrill and many 
other cases show, the courts do not always protect “all real invention 
present”—nor should they. If claims have some role—any role—in defining 
property rights, then courts must be willing at some point to restrict the 
scope of patent rights based on the claims even if real invention is described 
elsewhere in the patent. 
147. Williams Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 371–82 (1942) 
(Black, J., joined by Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 371. 
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tations.”149 Subsequent history suggests an even more permissive 
attitude to patents with numerous claims. 
The current acceptance of large numbers of claims seems puzzling 
at first. Learned Hand is right (as he usually is) that numerosity in 
claiming undermines the function of claims, which are supposed to 
define the boundaries of intellectual property rights. Property deeds do 
not contain dozens or hundreds of metes and bounds, each set of which 
may or may not provide the correct demarcation of the property rights. 
Why does our legal system tolerate such complexity and imprecision in 
patent law? The answer here turns on the inherent difficulty in 
developing the law defining patent right boundaries. As the practice of 
defining boundaries has developed in a decentralized fashion, it 
necessarily develops incrementally, and in fits and starts. There are 
wrong turns, abandoned experiments, and general uncertainty about 
the permissible style and substance of proper patent boundaries. In such 
an environment—one inherently lacking the “settled rules” that the 
Merrill Court mistakenly perceived 140 years ago—tolerating numerous 
claims has value in permitting continued experimentation, and 
continued progress, in the law of claiming. 
Conclusion: Matching Patent Rights to What       
Was “Really Invented” 
I conclude with a confession. This essay started out with a tentative 
title something like “The Patent Office’s Leadership in Developing the 
Claiming of Patent Rights.” The essay was going to trace the 
development of modern claiming practices through the guiding admin–
istrative decisions of the Patent Office, but that essay could not be 
written because the tentative thesis turned out to be not true. The 
development of modern claiming practices is a much more complicated 
story in which practicing lawyers first and foremost developed claiming 
styles, and the agency and courts slowly reacted to those styles. Now-
standard practices grew slowly and fitfully, and significant areas of 
uncertainty persisted through many decades. Indeed, many uncer–
tainties survive to this day. 
The leaderless development of claiming practices may help to 
explain why lawyers sought greater numbers of claims. Several different 
formats for claiming the same type of invention continued to exist in 
parallel for decades, and attorneys could not be certain how those 
claims would be viewed by courts in the future. Multiplying claims was 
a pragmatic solution to the uncertainty, and despite some prominent 
complaints about excessive numbers of claims, the agency and the 
courts largely let patent attorneys have their fill of claims. 
This history also raises the larger point that courts should avoid 
overestimating the degree to which patent law has sufficiently well-
 
149. Ellis, supra note 79, § 158, at 191. 
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settled rules of claiming so that claims can achieve precision in defining 
property rights. Two subsidiary points follow, both of which are evident 
in Merrill.  
First, courts should avoid using hindsight in construing patent 
claims. The problem of hindsight in patent law is frequently raised as 
a warning to courts against overestimating what would have been 
“obvious” to a person of skill in the relevant technological art in an 
earlier time period.150 Yet the problem can equally arise in adjudicating 
the scope and meaning of patent claims, with hindsight overestimations 
of what would have been clear in the legal art of writing claims at the 
time the claims were written.  
The history of the underlying patent in Merrill provides an 
excellent example. Despite the Supreme Court’s positing of “well-settled 
rules” in the patent system of 1877, the rules concerning claiming a 
composition of matter were so unsettled when the patent was granted 
in 1869 that even the Patent Office’s own model specification and claim 
for a composition of matter contained flaws highly similar to the ones 
identified by the Court in Merrill as foreclosing any reading of the claim 
to cover a product rather than a process. Identifying the meaning of a 
patent claim once it has been issued is an inherently backward-looking 
exercise because the claim is written at an earlier time in light of the 
then-existing legal conventions and technological knowledge. Courts 
interpreting patent claims and deciding the extent of patent rights have 
to be wary of hindsight bias every bit as much as they do in deciding 
patent validity issues such as obviousness. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, courts construing the 
extent of patent rights should always be attentive to—in the Merrill 
Court’s words—“that which was really invented.”151 Merrill is rightly 
famous for elevating the importance of claims in defining patent rights, 
but the case should be equally famous for continuing the tradition of 
construing claims in light of the technological contribution of the 
inventor. Linguistics alone will not do; nor will the often unsettled and 
fluid rules of patent claiming. The one truly settled rule—the only rule 
identified as a “rule” by Merrill—is that courts should try, if fairly 





150. See, e.g., KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (instructing that courts 
must be aware of the “distortion caused by hindsight bias” and “be cautious 
of arguments reliant on ex post reasoning”). See also Zoltec Corp. v. United 
States, 815 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting precedents on the 
unreliability of “[h]indsight reconstruction for litigation ends”).  
151. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.  
